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RESPONSE
ACCENTUATE THE NORMATIVE: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
MCKENNA
Jeremy N. Sheff*

IN

his article, “A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law,”1 Professor Mark McKenna makes two significant
claims. The first is that the dominant Law and Economics theory of
trademark law—the search-costs theory of the Chicago School—is
in some way connected to recent undesirable expansions of trademark rights. The second is that a preferable theory of trademark
law—one that would result in more tightly circumscribed and socially beneficial notions of trademark rights—would take consumer
decision making, rather than search costs, as its guiding principle. I
find myself sympathetic to these arguments, and yet I believe they
are subject to criticism on grounds that they violate Hume’s Law—
that is, they confuse the descriptive with the normative, the is with
the ought.2 In this response I will suggest that a careful untangling of
the descriptive and normative elements of McKenna’s project, while
perhaps undermining some of his claims, lends considerable support to his overall ambition of organizing trademark doctrine by
reference to a theory other than search-costs theory.
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s University.

98 Va. L. Rev. 67 (2012).
See 1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888)
(1739) (“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning . . . when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.”).
1
2

48

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2033369

2012]

Accentuate The Normative

49

Take, for example, McKenna’s first major argument—that searchcosts theory is causally connected to undesirable expansions of
trademark rights. McKenna claims that modern trademark doctrine
rests on a fallacious syllogism akin to the one that led Ionesco’s logician to conclude that Socrates was a cat,3 or that might give my
young son difficulty as he tries to understand the relationship between the category “rectangles” and the category “squares.” In classical formal terms, it is the illicit major premise fallacy in the argument that proceeds as follows:
1. All A are B.
2. All A are C.
3. Therefore all B are C.4
In McKenna’s telling, our thinking about trademark law relies on a
fallacious argument of equivalent form:
1. All consumer deception raises search costs.
2. All consumer deception is undesirable.
3. Therefore everything that raises search costs is undesirable.
McKenna seems to accept both premises of this argument—he
concedes that consumer deception raises “a certain kind of search
costs,”5 and much of his article is devoted to defending the principle
that consumer deception is undesirable.6 But of course, as a matter
of logical form an argument that attempts to derive the conclusion
“everything that raises search costs is undesirable” from these two
premises is invalid.7 Not content to stop here, McKenna further argues that the conclusion “everything that raises search costs is undesirable” is also contradicted by empirical evidence. Specifically, he
would like to persuade us that not all increases in search costs are
undesirable, at least not to all people.8
Eugène Ionesco, Rhinocéros 46 (1959).
See Michael F. Goodman, First Logic 73–74 (1993). For the source of this species of
logical analysis, see generally Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, at 39-113 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1984). This form
of syllogism is what Aristotelian logicians refer to as an AAA-3 argument, which is always invalid because the major term of the argument is distributed in the conclusion
but not in the major premise. See Goodman, supra at 73–74. Of course, classical Aristotelian logic has been largely supplanted in modern philosophy. See generally John P.
Burgess, Philosophical Logic (2009).
5 McKenna, supra note 1, at 71 n.10.
6 See, e.g., id. at 113.
7 Goodman, supra note 4, at 4 (defining a valid argument as one for which “it is impossible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false”).
8 McKenna, supra note 1, at 81–92.
3
4
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This is all fine and good so far as it goes. But the next move in the
argument invites more scrutiny. McKenna would like to convince us
that all of the problematic innovations in trademark doctrine over
the past half-century—innovations that have expanded the scope of
trademark rights far beyond what is necessary to prevent consumer
deception—are somehow causally connected to courts’ failure to reject this syllogism, and specifically their equation of search costs
with confusion.9 In his words: “search costs theory is complicit in
trademark law’s expansion to the extent it encourages courts to
equate confusion with search costs and to ignore the relationship
between search costs and consumer decision making.”10
I have three objections to this argument. The first is that I am not
sure what causal mechanism or relationship McKenna intends to
suggest with the word “complicit.” If it is merely that search-costs
theory has failed to rein in or roll back the doctrinal developments
of the past half-century, then we have our first violation of Hume’s
Law. Such an accusation of complicity is less a descriptive claim
about a causal relationship than a normative claim about the proper
scope of trademark rights. A theory’s failure to reverse doctrinal developments would count in its favor as a descriptive theory of the
doctrine in question; such failure is only a fault if one thinks the theory ought to generate different doctrine.
If McKenna’s accusation of complicity is indeed intended as a descriptive claim that search-costs theory somehow generates the doctrines of which he complains—perhaps through courts’ alleged
equation of “search costs” with “confusion”—then we come to my
second objection. To wit: I don’t believe this claim is consistent with
the cases McKenna cites in support of it. Of course, I concede that
the Supreme Court has invoked search-costs theory as a general justification for legal regulation of trademarks,11 and that Judge Posner
and his colleagues on the Seventh Circuit rely heavily on searchcosts theory in trademark cases. But tellingly, the most obvious exId. at 92–111.
Id. at 99.
11 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (cited in McKenna,
supra note 1, at 76 n.17). I don’t believe McKenna would disagree with the principles
announced in Qualitex: that color can be protectable as a trademark as a general matter, but might in particular circumstances provide a non-reputation-related advantage
that requires it to be available to competitors. Cf. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality,
48 Hous. L. Rev. 823, 847–54 (2011) (discussing competitive need as a principle of aesthetic functionality doctrine).
9
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ample McKenna cites—Judge Posner’s opinion in Ty v. Perryman—is
about dilution, not confusion, and moreover demonstrates the fundamental silliness of attempting to retroactively justify many modern trademark doctrines in terms of search costs, when their purposes and effects clearly lie elsewhere.12
Moreover, many of the confusion-based decisions McKenna objects to are not informed by search-costs theory in any obvious way.
Take, for example, the sponsorship and affiliation confusion cases
that McKenna knows all too well.13 Not one of the cases he discusses
in the section of his article dedicated to critiquing this doctrine says
anything about search costs.14 On initial-interest confusion, McKenna essentially concedes that misappropriation theory, not searchcosts theory, is driving the expansion of trademark rights.15 On postsale confusion, again, it is not search-costs theory that McKenna objects to, but the fact that courts are “always able to fall back in these
cases on broad references to the problem of consumer confusion.”16
If the judges in these cases are being led astray by search-costs theory, they are leaving no evidence of it in the text of their opinions.
Thus, McKenna seems to be relying on a fallacy of his own when
he argues that search-costs theory is somehow generating an undesirable expansion in trademark rights: the straw man. McKenna
claims that courts’ reasoning can be encapsulated in three related
propositions: (1) Courts “take it as a given that confusion necessarily harms consumers[, because] (2) [c]onfusion increases search
costs, and (3) search costs are bad. End of story.”17 But propositions
2 and 3 do not seem to be playing any significant role in the expansion of doctrine McKenna decries. Rather, all the work appears to be
done by proposition 1: the proposition that confusion harms consumers.
Compare Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002), with Rebecca Tushnet,
Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507
(2008).
13 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 Stan. L.
Rev. 413, 413 (2010).
14 See McKenna, supra note 1, at 94–99 & nn.76–90 and sources cited therein.
15 Id. at 99–102. Tellingly, one of the leading initial-interest confusion cases does discuss search costs as a general justification of trademark law, but this justification conspicuously disappears when the initial-interest theory is under consideration, in favor
of garden-variety misappropriation arguments. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.
West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048, 1053, 1062–65 (9th Cir. 1999).
16 McKenna, supra note 1, at 105 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 97 (numbering added).
12
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If this proposition is the fundamental flaw in modern trademark
doctrine, it is difficult to attribute it to the Chicago School. Likelihood of confusion has been the standard of federal trademark infringement since well before the Law and Economics movement
found its legs, let alone trained its sights on trademark law.18 To the
contrary, McKenna, like myself and many other trademark commentators, has invoked principles of welfare economics from which
search-costs theory is derived to critique recent expansions of
trademark rights as theoretically unsound.19 We would not be able
to make such arguments if trademark doctrine was consistent with
those principles. Thus, I think McKenna’s descriptive claim that
search-costs theory is somehow causally linked to an undesirable
expansion in trademark rights is unpersuasive.20
This is not, I think, as serious a fault as it might seem for McKenna’s project, because of my third objection to his argument about the
causal relationship between search-costs theory and expansive
trademark rights: it is irrelevant. Even if I’m correct that McKenna’s
descriptive claim fails to persuade, this does not settle the normative
question whether reducing consumer search costs ought to be the
goal of trademark law. On that normative question, I think McKenna
has the better of the argument. The empirical evidence he reviews
provides strong support for his normative claim that lowering
search costs ought not to be our organizing principle in trademark
cases. This is simply another way of saying that the conclusion of the
flawed syllogism I noted at the outset is false. Search-costs theory
need not be responsible for the expansion of trademark rights for us
to conclude that those rights are overbroad. And McKenna has given
us ample independent evidence of such overbreadth. So I view his
claim that courts equate search costs with confusion, while not entirely correct as a descriptive matter, as superfluous to the normative
thrust of his project—his defense of a model of trademark law based
See id. at 75 & n.17; compare Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437–38 (1946),
with Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 29–30 (8th ed. 2011) (dating the origins of the Law and Economics movement to approximately 1960); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265
(1987).
19 See generally, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 13 at 414–15; Mark P. McKenna,
Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 63 (2009).
20 Interestingly, this implies that the descriptive claims of the Chicago School—that
trademark doctrine has in fact been developed by courts to minimize search costs—is
similarly unpersuasive, at least with respect to the more recent doctrinal innovations
McKenna discusses.
18
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on consumer decision making—which I find appealing independent
of any comparison to search-costs theory. But this leaves us with
two important questions that I think have related answers. The first
is a descriptive question: what is driving the expansion of trademark
rights, if not search-costs theory? And the second is a normative
question: what ought trademark law be trying to do (if not lower
search costs) and why?
On the first question, McKenna’s article suggests some possible
culprits. One is the misappropriation theory that he recognizes is
behind initial-interest confusion doctrine and which has been the
target of some (well-earned, in my view) derision in trademark law
scholarship.21 But a more intriguing possibility is suggested by
McKenna’s assertion that courts treat search costs and confusion interchangeably. This claim appears to be the basis of his argument
for a causal link between search-costs theory and the expansion of
trademark rights.22 But if I’m correct that search-costs theory is not
playing a role in the cases in which courts expand trademark
rights,23 then McKenna’s assertion suggests a far deeper problem.
That is, I think his complaint is directed not against search-costs
theory, but against the likelihood of confusion standard for infringement itself.
McKenna’s own historical scholarship clearly demonstrates that
trademark liability was not always directed at consumer confusion—to the contrary, historically it was directed at fraud that resulted in diversion of trade.24 The Trademark Act of 1905, for example, made likelihood of confusion a barrier to registration, but
provided a much narrower definition of actionable infringement.25
Not until the 1920 Act does something approaching confusion enter

See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P.
McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 137 (2010); see also Robert G. Bone,
Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L.
Rev. 547, 592–618 (2006); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814–17 (1935); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397,
398–99 (1990).
22 See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text.
23 See supra notes 11–20.
24 See generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1841 (2007).
25 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84 §§ 5 & 16, 33 Stat. 724, 725–26 & 728.
21
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the statutory language defining a federal unfair competition claim,26
and only with the 1946 passage of the Lanham Act does likelihood of
confusion become central to trademark infringement liability. 27 It is
the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act that expand the range of
actionable confusion beyond confusion of “purchasers”—a development that commentators (including McKenna himself) have tied
to many of the doctrinal innovations he discusses.28
McKenna seems to suggest that a causal relationship between
search-costs theory and expanding trademark rights is implied by
the fact that both arise around the same time,29 but clearly these
statutory changes also line up with the expansionary trend in the
cases. So it seems to me that the historical record suggests at least as
strong a case for a causal relationship between the likelihood of confusion standard and the expansion of trademark rights (though we
might question which way the causation runs). In fact, I would suggest that this causal relationship is even more plausible than
McKenna’s claimed link between search-costs and expanding rights,
insofar as the expansionary cases uniformly cite the likelihood of
confusion standard of the Lanham Act, but rarely discuss search
costs at all.
What, then, might be the causal mechanism through which the
likelihood of confusion standard and the expansion of trademark
rights could be related? I think McKenna’s article suggests a highly
plausible explanation: “confusion” is an extremely broad term that
can encompass any number of mental states.30 Thus, as likelihood of
confusion came to replace more tightly circumscribed statutory
tests for infringement, the scope of trademark rights might well be
expected to expand to include those mental states (or vice versa,
perhaps). I believe that this insight is implicit in McKenna’s discussion of the development of trademark doctrine. But here again we
Act of Mar. 19, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-163 § 3, 41 Stat. 533, 534 (creating a private right
of action for false designation of origin and including “intent to deceive” as an element
of such a claim).
27 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489 §§ 32, 43, 60 Stat. 427, 437, 441 (1946). See also 4 J.
Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§ 24:1-6 (outlining historical
development of the modern likelihood of confusion test).
28 Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772 § 14, 76 Stat. 769, 771, 775; see also McKenna,
supra note 24, at 1904–05, 1905 n.282; Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:
Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 105, 160–61 (2005);
Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 769, 776–77 (2012).
29 McKenna, supra note 1, at 79.
30 Id. at 92–94.
26
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run into Hume’s Law. McKenna’s closing argument on this point
runs a descriptive claim as to what the likelihood of confusion test
does together with a normative claim about the appropriate targets
of trademark law: “it is obvious on a moment’s reflection,” he claims,
“that trademark law cannot, and should not, respond to all forms of
confusion or even to all confusion in the marketplace.”31 It is worth
teasing these two claims apart.
I don’t agree that trademark law cannot, as a descriptive matter,
respond to all forms of confusion in the marketplace resulting from
unauthorized use of a trademark. Indeed, many of the doctrines
McKenna criticizes strike me as examples of judges attempting to do
precisely that in service to the Lanham Act’s broad command. I argued above that this statutory breadth, rather than reliance on
search-costs theory, is probably what accounts for the expansion in
trademark rights documented in the first half of McKenna’s article.
But if I’m correct, my descriptive claim makes McKenna’s second
claim—his normative claim—all the more important. If the term
“confusion” is as broad as it appears to be, then the “likelihood of
confusion” test for infringement becomes something of an empty
vessel that can be filled with any number of normative claims regarding the appropriate scope of trademark rights, any one of which
might be highly contestable. When such contestable claims end up
embodied in positive law, we may well have cause to complain
about the result, but it is incumbent on us to explain through normative argument what makes the result undesirable. Even if the likelihood of confusion standard, as applied by the courts, could eliminate
all forms of consumer confusion from the marketplace, the question
remains whether we would want it to do so.
McKenna claims the answer to this question must be no, and part
of his support for this claim is his empirical evidence on the psychological and welfare effects of search costs. But it seems to me that
this evidence, standing alone, can at best rule out reduction of
search costs as a comprehensive normative goal for trademark law.
While this is not an insignificant achievement, and stands as a major
contribution of McKenna’s article, it is not the same thing as an affirmative normative account of trademark law, which is what I think
McKenna hopes to provide. Thus, we return to the second question I

31

Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
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identified earlier: what ought trademark law be trying to do, and
why?
McKenna’s answer to this question takes up the second half of his
article, and can be summarized in the simple directive: “prevent deception that influences consumer purchasing decisions.” His reasons
in support of this position are bound up in a particular theory of
consumer autonomy, one which holds that consumers are the best
judges of their own preferences,32 that they are entitled to determine and pursue those preferences without interference by others,33 and that they need not (or perhaps ought not) be protected
from others’ efforts to shape those preferences in the absence of deception.34 This vision of consumer autonomy strikes me as the main
contribution of McKenna’s article, and it bears unpacking.
I am interested in identifying the source of the normative content
that informs McKenna’s proposal, because I believe that here as well
there is an is/ought problem buried beneath the surface. Ostensibly,
McKenna derives his model of consumer autonomy from false advertising law and commercial speech doctrine.35 But while the argument from authority is not necessarily fallacious in the commonlaw system, it provides no normative content of its own. The cases
McKenna cites suggest that normative values inherent in the First
Amendment underlie his model of autonomy,36 but his own analysis
is remarkably quiet as to what those values are.
One possible normative value is improving outcomes: perhaps
McKenna’s model of consumer autonomy will lead to the best results as measured by some relevant standard. Recall that McKenna’s
argument for rejecting search-costs theory as a foundation for
trademark law rests on his descriptive claim that not all reductions
in search costs increase consumer welfare. A concern over consumer welfare is shot through his critique of search-costs theory,37 and
it implies a normative criterion for evaluating that theory and the
doctrine it purports to justify. This criterion is that increases in aggregate welfare are desirable, and decreases in aggregate welfare
are undesirable—the welfare-maximization principle at the heart of
the economic analysis of law.
Id. at 73, 122.
Id. at 72, 112–13, 124–25.
34 Id. at 122–24.
35 Id. at 120–24.
36 See id. and sources cited therein.
37 Id. at 86–90, 141.
32
33
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I do not believe that McKenna’s model of consumer autonomy is
entirely consistent with this normative principle, which creates an
odd disconnect between the descriptive project of the first half of
his article and the normative project of the second half. If McKenna’s
problem with search-costs theory is that it generates doctrine that
leads to decreases in consumer welfare, one would expect his alternative normative framework to avoid this failing. But it seems to me
that his theory does not require all decreases in consumer welfare
that result from trademark-related practices be avoided. And importantly, it is not clear to me whether McKenna’s reason for tolerating decreases in consumer welfare is grounded in a descriptive
claim that the alternative to such toleration invites an even larger
decrease in aggregate social welfare or a normative claim that values
distinct from and incommensurate with consumer welfare—First
Amendment values, perhaps—must take precedence.
Take McKenna’s discussion of the distinction between deception
and persuasion—a distinction on which some of his proposals for
doctrinal reform rest.38 One the one hand, he suggests that the administrative costs of attempting to regulate persuasion are too
high—that it would be impracticable and “messy” to do so, and error in the attempt could lead to reduction in the availability of socially valuable information.39 This is a descriptive claim: the welfare
losses that result from consumer susceptibility to persuasive messages are less than the welfare losses that would result from attempting to regulate such messages. On the other hand, McKenna
suggests that attempts to regulate persuasive messaging are undesirable regardless of their effect on consumer welfare: “due regard
for consumer autonomy requires us to live with [consumers’] decisions even if they are bad.”40 This is a normative argument, and it
cannot be supported by reference to calculations of consumer welfare. To the contrary, it implies that even if regulation of persuasive
messages would increase aggregate welfare, we should still refrain
from such regulation.
I don’t think either of these arguments is flawed in principle, but I
would like to know which one McKenna would like us to rely on in
evaluating his proposals. The main reason for my curiosity is that
the descriptive argument is subject to empirical testing and (potenId. at 122–24, 128–31, 133–36.
Id. at 117–18.
40 Id. at 120.
38
39
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tially) falsification, while the normative argument is not. This suggests a potential for conflicts between the two arguments, which
would require us to decide which of them carries more weight.
I think the clearest example of such conflict lies in the potential
for paternalist intervention that increases aggregate welfare.
McKenna uses the term “paternalist” as a broadside, invoking all the
most pejorative connotations of the term.41 “[T]rademark law,” he
insists, “should not coddle consumers.”42 But of course there is a
lively debate across a number of disciplines (including law) as to
whether, and under what circumstances, paternalist intervention
might be permissible or even desirable.43
For example, I have written in the past that trademarks supported
by advertising can bias consumers.44 That is, marketing practices
can lead consumers to hold beliefs about the objective qualities of
products that are both false and resistant to correction by exposure
to empirical evidence, without making claims about such objective
qualities. I think that McKenna would agree that a consumer whose
purchasing decisions are biased in the sense I have described is likely to make decisions that lead to lower aggregate welfare than
would be the case in the absence of the biasing marketing practice.
What I don’t know is whether McKenna would countenance regulation to curb such biasing marketing practices.
Another conflict arises in the case of unauthorized uses of trademarks on goods of equivalent quality to the plaintiff’s goods. Suppose a defendant applied a plaintiff’s trademark without authorization to a product that was in every measurable way precisely
identical to the plaintiff’s products, but was offered by the defendant
at a lower price. A consumer who purchased the defendant’s goods
in reliance on the trademark would be deceived in a way that affected their decision to purchase, but would be better off for that purchase than she would have been in the absence of the deception. As I
discuss in forthcoming work, extant doctrine suggests that such a

Id. at 81, 120, 129.
Id. at 138.
43 Space does not permit me to review this debate here; it is a debate I discuss in Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2021394.
44 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1245 (2011).
41
42

2012]

Accentuate The Normative

59

defendant’s conduct would constitute trademark infringement,45
even though this result clearly causes a reduction in aggregate welfare, at least as a matter of first-order effects. Again, it is not clear to
me whether McKenna’s model would endorse or reject that result.
These two examples are obviously outside the scope of McKenna’s article, but they reveal the tension at the heart of his project. In
the first case, legal intervention might prevent a decrease in consumer welfare attributable to non-deceptive, non-persuasive uses of
trademarks by their owners. In the second, legal intervention causes
a decrease in consumer welfare in preventing a deception that actually makes consumers better off. To the extent McKenna’s rejection
of search-costs theory in favor of a consumer decision-making theory is premised on the welfare effects of search costs, we might conclude that a concern for consumer welfare would lead McKenna to
allow intervention in the first example and to reject it in the second.
But to the extent McKenna’s embrace of a consumer decisionmaking theory is premised on other values that are inherent in a
particular model of consumer autonomy, we might expect him to reject legal intervention in the first example and endorse it in the second on grounds that the law ought to leave it to consumers to negotiate the mix of information available in the marketplace even if the
consequences reduce aggregate welfare.46
In sum, it is not clear to me whether McKenna’s consumer decision-making theory is grounded in the normative principles of welfare economics or in some alternative normative principle. If the latter, it is not clear to me what the alternative normative principle is
(beyond the ipse dixit that autonomy is a value in itself). There are
suggestions in his article that such alternative principles might be
found in the justifications for the First Amendment, and on this issue
perhaps the work of my co-respondent, Professor Laura Heymann,
is most instructive.47 But even if this is correct, the argument by
analogy to First Amendment principles requires us to explore the
Sheff, supra note 43, at 42–47 (citing, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439,
461 (2d Cir. 2004); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497,
505 (2d Cir. 1996)).
46 See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 1, at 136–38. Importantly, neither of these examples
implicates the special cases of non-commercial uses and expressive uses, as to which
McKenna suggests “external values” might impose limits on trademark liability independently of a concern for consumer decision making (or, for that matter, for search
costs). Id. at 112.
47 See generally Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 651, 657 (2009).
45
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normative values that underlie those principles, and to evaluate
their merits against those of the welfare-maximization principle.
For my part, I think McKenna’s consumer decision-making model
will be more persuasive if it explicitly disavows welfare maximization as the sole—or even the most important—normative value at
stake in trademark cases. Reliance on welfare maximization reduces
too many close and contested policy debates to empirical questions
in which the relevant data is necessarily absent.48 Frequently, we
must take recourse to some other values that can avoid the empirical impasse. In some areas trademark law already recognizes such
values—particularly with respect to expressive uses of trademarks.49 An interesting question, then, is whether we can build a
more complete and coherent model of the values at stake in trademark law. I have some ideas about this,50 and I think they are largely
consistent with McKenna’s consumer decision-making model. I
would encourage him to flesh out these hidden foundations of his
model—to accentuate the normative—in the hopes of escaping the
is/ought problems that unnecessarily detract from the force of his
otherwise very appealing claims.

See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 44, at 1311–13.
See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 1, at 112.
50 See generally Sheff, supra note 43.
48
49

